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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to explore how the demand of germplasm held by 
CGIAR genebanks changed over time in order to assess the possible influence of the 
1994 In Trust Agreements on germplasm demand. The proposed theoretic model 
motivates the realistic hypothesis that the consequences of the In-Trust Agreements 
lead to an enhancement of CGIAR germplasm utilization. Therefore the paper firstly 
examines the classical literature on biodiversity’s valuation and its recent 
developments and subsequently it investigates the origin of the agricultural 
biodiversity’s economic value, providing a basic conceptual framework to infer on 
factors determining the demand for germplasm. Two Bayesian estimation frameworks 
are applied to the IRRI accessions distribution’s time-series to provide formal evidence 
to the hypothesis, exploiting Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, Gibbs sampling in 
particular. Evidence suggests that the demand variation implies a change in the genetic 
collections economic value, impacting therefore on their direct use search value. 
Keywords: Crop genetic resources, germplasm collection, search theoretic framework, 
count data, changepoints. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper has three purposes. The first is to develop a theoretical framework 
through which it is possible to derive the demand of genetic resources and explain how 
it is affected by the demand’s factors. The second is to examine the hypothesis that the 
In Trust Agreements had an impact on the availability and therefore on the economic 
value of the CGIAR germplasm held In Trust as a result of the signed agreements. The 
third purpose is to conduct formal investigations on factors affecting germplasm 
demand, testing the assumed hypothesis on the agreement’s effects throughout the 
utilization of econometric frameworks. 
The study’s background is the conservation, use and exploitation of plant 
genetic resources (PGRs). Nowadays crop genetic resources are considered as an 
indispensable humanity’s agricultural heritage. In the recent past, genetic erosion and 
cultures homogeneity’s issues rose. The destructions of natural ecosystems and the 
incessant spread of high yielding cultivars began to deteriorate agricultural diversity. 
Agricultural biodiversity is defined by FAO (1998) as the key element of food and 
livelihood security improvement, assuring rural development and environmental 
sustainability as well as establishing the basis for future technological innovations in 
agriculture. Crops’ genetic improvement in fact has assured considerable productivity 
gains in agriculture: nearly the 50% of the U.S increased yields during 1930-1980 has 
been attributed to genetic resources by recent studies (Johnson et al., 2003). Since the 
1960s the increase utilization of genetic resources has promoted a multilateral 
international collaboration between countries and International Agricultural Research 
Centres (IARC) to exchange genetic resources and breeding new varieties: 50 
members countries and donor agencies established in 1972 the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), worried by the common apprehension 
that many developing countries would lose soon their agricultural resources and plant 
diversity.  
PGRs for food and agriculture are today mainly stored in ex-situ collection 
(genebanks) through several laboratory methods. Genebanks constitute the more 
accessible and inexpensive source of PGRs, gaining plant breeders’ preferences 
especially thanks to the evaluative information attached to each germplasm sample 
(Fowler et al., 2000). Latest discoveries in plant breeding methods and especially in   3
genetic engineering have further increased the value of ex-situ genetic collections. 
IARC carries out frequently research on new ways of utilization and screening of the 
valuable traits, commercializing cultivars and recombinant breeding lines, assigning 
directly great economic value to the resources. To illustrate the importance, FAO 
(1998) statistics refer to almost 6 million of crop accessions collected by nearly 1400 
genebanks worldwide located. 
The recent intellectual property rights’ international debate involved also the 
germplasm held by CGIAR centres. The political debate on the ownership of the PGR 
held in the CGIAR genebanks resulted in the establishment of In Trust Agreements 
between FAO and the CGIAR Centres in 1994 that formalized the legal status of 
“public goods” of the ex-situ germplasm held by CGIAR genebanks. Since 1994 more 
than 600.000 accessions stored in the 11 CGIAR genebanks, are held “In Trust”, “for 
the benefit of the international community”, practically freely available, according to 
the agreements. Furthermore the “In Trust” collections are highly diversified, well 
organized and documented, and for these reasons they are largely used worldwide, 
especially by developing countries (Fowler, 2000). An impressive economic value, but 
presently unknown, is probably associated to a resource so much used and with so 
large potential use: thus several motivations occur to investigate genetic stocks 
demand and to infer on the economic value associated to their utilization. 
A search theoretic framework is chosen to model the genebanks samples 
demand with the scope to assess the infer of the In Trust agreements on it and their 
economic consequences on the genetic resources’ value. Some econometric models 
will be proposed to face the statistical change-point’s problem, with the prospect to 
individuate the effects of the In Trust protocols on the samples demand. The data 
utilized have been provided by IRRI. Firstly, a generalized linear Poisson model 
specific in the change-point investigation is applied. Secondly a Gaussian linear model 
is adopted, extending the model to handle count data, and exploiting dataset 
characteristics with a single-layer hierarchical setup. The proposed procedures for 
conceptual and empirical evaluations can be applied to prove other hypothesizes, 
assessing any factors determining germplasm demand, investigating therefore their 
contributions to the economic value of plant genetic resources. 
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2.  THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES  
The economic value of the In-Trust Agreements lies in the value of the 
collections that are kept in trust in CGIAR genebanks. According to Ehrlich and 
Wilson (1991), a biodiversity resource should be valued by considering its ethical and 
aesthetical aspects, the direct economic benefit, and recognizing its role as the natural 
provider of several ecosystem services. The human race being the undiscussed ruler of 
the earth has a moral absolute responsibility in the preservation of all species living. 
Furthermore there is an effective consumers’ demand for the biodiversity preservation 
for its aesthetic characteristic as estimated by numerous studies using revealed 
preferences techniques on the willingness to pay for wild-life regions’ preservation 
(see for example the studies of Kramer and Mercer, 1997, Jakobsson and Dragun, 2001 
and Barnes et al., 1999) or to avoid animal extinction (Cicia et al., 2003). The direct 
economic benefit derives from the biodiversity’s characteristic to be a “genetic 
library”, thus helping new crops breeding and being the source of new industrial or 
pharmaceutical products. The reason, enunciated lastly by Ehrlich and Wilson (1991), 
is nowadays being more considered by public opinion: different living organisms form 
the natural ecosystem and an alteration of its constitution because extinctions or 
indiscriminate humanization or taming of wild area, may cause atmosphere’s 
alteration, impacting on climate changes, aggravating undefined social costs. 
Economic theory helps us fixing the criterions to assign an absolute worth to a 
complex good such as the biodiversity. The Total Economic Value (TEV) framework 
has been used largely in natural resources economic literature and applied to 
biodiversity valuation for the first time by Pearce and Moran (1994). Even if the exact 
terminology may change among the studies, TEV scheme identifies three primary 
valuations of natural resources, which jointly constitute the total value measure one 
may attribute to the genetic resource stock. As notes by Smale and Koo (2003), the 
main values consist of so-called ‘use value’ (UV); ‘non-use value’; (NUV) and ‘option 
value’ (OV). 
Use Value may be sub-divided into categories describing direct (DUV) and 
indirect use value (IUV), whether conferred benefits are clearly observed when the 
resource is consumed. Direct use includes the value of the consumptive uses, deriving 
directly from the material consumption of the good and the value of non-  5
consumptive’s uses that refers to the benefits of activities such as recreational that do 
not require a persistent alteration of the products. Indirect use value covers all benefits 
originated from the resources’ services and their secondary functions. Use value 
embraces present use value and expected future use value, as well as the value of 
maintaining the possibility to meet some unknown, future event or potential use —
called option value (OV). 
Non-use value, also measured in both present and future terms, refers to the 
consumers’ benefit gained as a result of the simple existence of the resource, its so-
called existence value (XV). This value is otherwise called Bequest value (BV) if the 
worth is derived from the knowledge that others can instead use the good.  
Other economists cite the ‘quasi-option value’ also. They refer to the value to 
conserve a known low option value, waiting for new information that can change 
irreversibly the scenario. On the subject, Swanson (1998) includes the quasi-option 
value to the total economic value of plant genetic resources, mentioning the value to 
preserve a known poor value variety with the scope to use it in the rare event that the 
particular disease occurs. 
In these contexts, estimation of the value of PGRs is a difficult task. This 
assignment is further exacerbated given the multidimensional and inter-temporal 
natures of germplasm stocks. A direct evidence of the value for each element in the 
PGRs total economic value is absolutely more difficult to account than the value of 
other goods that benefit an efficient market. The peculiarity of natural reproducibility 
of the good, the impossibility to clearly establish the property rights and to identify 
distinctly the beneficiaries intensify the public good characteristics of PGRs, making 
the economist task worse.  
As Pardey et al. (2001) stress, to attribute the right agronomic gains to the 
conserved germplasm used in a crop production system seems empirically highly 
problematic. If during experimental yield trials the agronomic gains associated with 
the introduction of a variety causing higher crop production or less tilling costs may be 
quite easily observables, in the open field several components can interact with each 
other, enhancing or thwarting the effects, making hard to separate the productive gain 
deriving the breeding activity from new agricultural adoptions and climate and soil 
particular characteristics. In the absence of any market for unimproved genetic   6
resources, value cannot be measured directly. This is why, according to Pardey et al., 
methodologies developed so far are mainly unreliable. Furthermore to separate the 
human capital’s effort from unimproved genetic resources’ contribution in the 
breeding and genetic selection activity is seldom possible. For the above reason, many 
authors prefer simply to focus the study on the “genetic enhancement” valuation 
(Rubenstein et al., 2005). Lastly the individual production’s gains have to be 
aggregated successively to the industry level, considering the global impact on the 
producers and consumers of other crops and other countries too, accounting for all 
possible externalities, in order to evaluate fully the social surplus deriving by the 
introduction of a genetic improvement. 
When the market price is unavailable, intellectual fashion suggests applying 
direct methods to elicit consumer preferences. Direct methods are so used largely in 
the economic valuation of environmental resources. In the PGRs’ case, a survey’s 
efficacy, based, for example, on willingness to pay (perhaps elicited through 
contingent valuation or a choice experiment), is reduced by the subject matter’s 
scientific complexity (Smale and Koo, 2003). As Evenson and Santaniello (1998) 
state, contingent valuation methods seem more applicable to value consumers’ goods 
rather than production inputs because respondents have difficulty comprehending 
PGRs production functions and attendant difficulties assigning subjective value to their 
inputs. 
According to Smale and Koo (2003), PGRs ‘non-use value’ estimation appears 
trifling: the conservation activity of a genebank implies an effective present or future 
use. At the same time, PGR ‘option value’ refers to the expected future value of a 
completely unknown benefit. Because of this strong uncertainty characteristic, 
estimation of non use value is beset with difficulties and it is highly challenging. 
Furthermore, because option value is likely positive, the total PGR value is usually 
underestimated by analysis employing market prices and quantities. Furthermore, 
analytical approaches employing these market derived variables are intrinsically 
ineffective in capturing a non-marketable economic value. Similarly, evaluation of a 
marginal accession requires ‘significant expense in time, talent and money’ (Pardey et 
al., 1999). Also, such estimation, when enacted, generally underestimates the total 
value of the resources’ stock because the material is often used more than once, in   7
subsequent breeding efforts, at different times and in different places (Rubenstein et 
al., 2006).  
An antithetical approach with merit performs cost evaluation of collecting and 
conserving accessions. Studies by Pardey et al. (1999, 2001) and Koo et al. (2003) 
cover this estimation option. The objective is to elaborate a conservative evaluation of 
marginal accession costs, in order to justify germplasm conservation, if the costs result 
generally less than the potential benefits conferred. Studies by Pardey et al. (1999, 
2001), exploit microeconomics concepts in order to extract marginal accession costs, 
and calculate the amount of the endowment necessary to ensure endurable future 
conservation for the genetic materials held by the CIMMYT genebank. The same 
methodology is applied later by Koo et al. (2003), to value the resources held by 
CGIAR genebanks. The investigations highlight the insignificance of the costs of 
holding resources compared to the present and future potential benefits available. 
Several recent empirical studies focus estimation on the use value of PGR 
stocks through the benefits of breeding acquired by improvement of crop varieties on 
agricultural productivity, or on cost reduction. Hedonic pricing approaches, and 
production functions analysis methodology share this common principle (Milne et al., 
2002). 
A hedonic approach exploits a resource’s marginal value through regression 
estimation of the explicit price of the tradable product on the implicit prices of a non-
marketable good’s attributes. The same principle has been applied by Evenson and 
Gollin (1998) to link the Indian rice productivity of several regions with the peculiar 
characteristics of the genetic material adopted in each location. According to the 
results, the varietal improvements account for more than one third of the total rice 
productivity gains achieved during the period 1972-1984. Furthermore the contribution 
of certain PGRs’ stocks in the rice productivity in India result quite high, nearly $74 
millions per year overriding largely maintenance and operative costs of the germplasm 
collection, 10$ millions per year. 
Production function analysis has been used by Evenson and Gollin (1997). 
They evaluate the economic role of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in 
improving rice cultivars. IRRI’s activities include germplasm’s collection and 
exchange, and direct supply of bred varieties to farmers. A genealogical analysis has   8
been conducted to highlight progenitor traits in 20 improved modern varieties. IRRI’s 
global economic impact is estimated through an econometric analysis directed to 
determining the contribution of accessions to the average value of modern rice 
varieties. With conservative assumption on the discount rate, the provided estimations 
are impressive: over a period of 20 years the whole IRRI impact is around $1.9 billion. 
Moreover the present value of a single accession implemented succesfully into a 
modern variety is also estimated to be nearly $50 millions, meanwhile 1,000 
catalogued accessions are accounted for $325 millions. Other examples of this 
approach are available from the literature. One noteworthy is Smale et al. (1998) who 
analyze the impact of the PGRs in enhancing agricultural productivity, reducing 
production fluctuations and affecting cropped variety diversity in wheat production in 
the Punjab, Pakistan. Genetic resources and diversity data are assembled and their 
marginal contribution to production is estimated through use of the Just and Pope 
stochastic production functions. Thirtle (1985) valuates the share of the ‘biological 
change’ including the genetic enhancements, in the production of five major U.S food 
crops during the period 1939-1978. The author, nesting CES and Cobb-Douglas 
production functions, infers that the biological component has assured a yield 
improvement in average of 1% per year, nearly the 50% of the total yield growth 
observed. 
 
3.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORETICAL MODELS: INVESTIGATING GERMPLASM 
DEMAND FACTORS 
This paragraph has the objective to present some of the most renowned 
conceptual models published in the literature on genetic resource stocks’ valuation. 
The scope is to review the theoretical foundations of bioprospecting and genetic 
resources economics, attempting to assign mathematical rigour to the follower 
empirical application. Furthermore, any judgement and valuation, also economic, on 
preservation of biodiversity, genebanks management, and bioprospecting, need an 
analytical simplification and efficacious model helping to infer on. The complexity of 
the subject infact leads sometimes to a generalized confusion. The several conflicting 
motivations and the different values involved during the decision-process exacerbate 
further the situation. Although strong assumptions may sometimes imply diverse 
consequences among different theoretical framework. Three conceptual models will be   9
so briefly discussed and lastly a simple theoretical framework will be developed. It is 
based on the search models, which appear most efficacious and suitable given 
available data and paper’s aims. 
Valuing option value, Polasky’s theoretical model 
The Polasky’s theoretical model (Polasky et al., 1993, Polasky and Solow, 
1995) is based basically on two assumptions. Firstly, the motivations to conserve 
species are essentially related to its uncertain potential value to provide in future some 
benefit (a medicinal cure for example). Secondly the phylogenetic closeness makes the 
species substitute for each other, because the relative similarity of their genes. For the 
above reasons decisions on species conservation have to be assumed valuing their 
potential value first, and so precisely focusing the attention on the option value and 
then preferring more heterogeneous set of species to less. According to the author, 
considering other sources of value in the decision process is quite useless: species with 
a recognized direct use value benefit already survival’s possibility thanks to the 
market. However the author highlights that direct valuable species can influence, 
because of their gene pools, the option value of the other species too. 
T = (s1, …, sn) is the set of species under investigation, while S is the set under 
conservation. C is the potential benefit, P(S) denotes the probability that the S set has 
C. The option value to conserve the set S is simply:  
(1)    B(S) = CP(S) = CP(S, T) P(T) 
where P(S,T) is the conditional probability that S contains the potential benefit given 
that T contains it: P(S, T) can be interpreted as a diversity measure, introducing in the 
calculation of the conditional probability, a coefficient that considers the relative 
diversity genetic of S in T through specific spatial measures. 
The Polasky framework is innovative mainly for introducing in the genetic 
stocks economic value directly a measure of genetic diversity. The measure is then 
linked to the probability to gain a benefit, the basis of bioprospecting problem, 
retrieved also by the search model. The result is a model that even though seems 
appropriate to valuing collection of species like a genebank, it results lacking in the 
cost of searching valuable traits.    10
Modelling extinction risk, Weitzman’s Ark 
Noah’s Ark problem is the fascinate metaphor name used by Weitzman to call 
his simple analytical framework in biodiversity economic issue. The author in several 
works (Weitzman, 1993 and 1998, and Metrick and Weitzman, 1998) investigates the 
problem of biodiversity’s preservation, with the aim to derive criteria or priorities to 
follow in the decision process for the choice of the conservation strategy. The model 
has its roots in a simple constrained optimization problem wherein the biodiversity 
appears in the objective function: for n available species, indexed i = 1,2,.. .,n 
(2)    maximize{Pi} [W({Pi}) + U({Pi})] ; 
while the constraint is represented by a budget function including the costs to increase 
for each species i the probability of surviving; practically the cost to involve it in a 
conservation, preservation program. Under the budget constraint, the problem is solved 
selecting values of {Pi}, the probability that the i species survives, maximizing the 
sum of the ‘expected direct utility function’ U({Pi}), approximately the total economic 
value of the i species preserved, (the author refers to a “combination of commercial, 
recreational and, emotional benefits”) and W({Pi}), called by Weitzman the ‘expected 
diversity function’, representing the genetic diversity of the species i, related to the 
information content in the hold genes. The ‘boarding Ark’ allegory becomes so easily 
comprehensible: investing in a conservation project improves the probability of 
survival of the selected species, but since the Ark has a limited capacity, the 
optimization routine set the priority species. From the maximization problem, the 
author derives also an easy formulation in order to give an effective ranking criterion. 











where for each species i, Ui is the direct utility, Di the distinctiveness, Ci the cost to 
improve the survivability of ΔPi, while Ri is the monetary-diversity measure.  
Noah’s Ark theoretical framework points out several useful remarks in the 
economics of genetic stocks’ discussions. These features make the model especially 
suitable to minimization of biodiversity loss problems as some practical applications 
prove. Specifically, Simianer et al., (2003) and Reist-Marti et al., (2003), exploiting 
the Ark, provide successfully indication on preservation of cattle breeds programs.   11
Practically the authors verify some difficulties assigning arbitrarily probabilities value 
reporting furthermore that the observed ranking criterion is more affected by diversity 
genetic than extinction’s risk. Infact as reported by the same Weitzman, the 
maximization routine may suggest ‘counterintuitive’ actions: ‘sacrificing’ one high 
risks extinction species, deciding to increase the protection of the safer one. Even if the 
Weitzman’s framework performs well for decision-making process, the provided 
formulation does not allow to investigate either an economic value of biodiversity, (the 
objective function is expressed in a diversity-monetary term) or to explain correctly 
genetic stock users demand and crops’ genebanks management. The two above 
frameworks share this problematic. It is known infact that the principal aim of ex-situ 
conservation of the plant genetic resources is prevalently addressed, satisfying plant-
breeders needs, to sustain agricultural productivity growth, to reduce biotic and abiotic 
crops’ vulnerability. The diversity genetic is a value that in the PGRs case is quite 
misleading: world’s largest genebank is generally specialized in a small number of 
species, preferring to maximize intra-species and not inter-species diversity. They 
infact constitute huge collections of the same species, facilitating in term of 
reproductive reasons the breeders’ activities. Hence the effort to build the phylogenetic 
structure of the species hold in the genebank does not seem to reward a theoretical 
improvement of the conceptual model, at least for this work’s purposes. 
Searching for a direct use value, the literature 
Search-theoretic frameworks attempt to simulate the stochastic nature of 
breeding research and the successes and failures that they experience. When the 
probability of failure is non-zero, search must be conducted in order to determine 
whether particular genetic traits may be useful. Thus the search process may be time-
consuming and costly because all the activities required for the trait evaluation such as 
molecular screening or agronomic tests (set by Zohrabian et al., 2003, at about 7$ per 
accession, per a single trait), in addition to the acquisition-transaction costs. This 
aspect of the research enterprise is worth emphasizing because often the germplasm 
stored in public genebanks lack detailed information concerning genetic 
characterization and the likelihood that a single accession will be useful. In addition, 
breeding outcomes can be quite unpredictable because of the unpredictable nature of 
genotype environment interactions. The search methodology assigns a present value to 
the expected future benefits of the research activity wherein benefits are compared to   12
costs in order to optimize the search activity. In the PGRs specific case, the probability 
of discovering a valuable trait during the search process is combined with its expected 
yield enhancement effects in order to evaluate the worth of a single germplasm 
accession. Seminal work of Evenson and Kislev (1976) gave impetus to several studies 
in valuing genetic stocks through this approach. That methodology, which is the first 
apply search theory to genetic resource evaluation, has roots grounded in a classic 
paper by Stigler (1961) who models consumer demand when a consumer, facing a 
price proposition, has uncertainty as to whether it is a minimum among possible 
alternatives. It is worth mentioning that this basic idea of Stigler (1961) spawned a vast 
growing literature related to job search, unemployment and related macroeconomic 
phenomena. An introduction to search formal analysis is contained in Sargent (1987), 
meanwhile Rogerson et al., (2005), present a recent literature survey on the subject. In 
the genetic resource Evenson and Kislev (1976), consider sugar-cane varieties’ 
discovery and model search within a distribution of the genetic trait – the random 
variable of interest – and assume that research effort can shift the mean of the 
distribution, change the variance or generate new distributions when new technologies 
are discovered. In their context it is possible to determine an optimal search strategy, 
and evaluate the impact that a gene stock might have, at least conceptually. 
A subsequent application by Gollin et al. (2000) extends the basic idea that 
search, which is costly, generates potential benefits and that these benefits have 
probability distributions attached to them. By exploiting the basic principle that 
marginal cost of an accession search should never exceed the marginal expected 
benefit that it generates, the authors simulate a search process and conduct Monte 
Carlo experiments, drawing probability distributions for the ‘useful’ trait from the 
Monte Carlo simulations. Gollin et al. (2000) evaluate the optimal size of a ‘search’ 
for a genetic trait, judging the usefulness of large collections characterized by low 
utilization, modelling the search for a resistance trait in wheat germplasm. 
Significantly, they note that a genebank’s existence value is justified, despite possible 
infrequent utilization whenever maintained traits are rare and economically relevant. 
Of course, determining the latter is sometimes very difficult, given the data constraints 
that typically occur. Notwithstanding this feature of the data-generating environment, 
search theory has inspired several noteworthy recent contributions. For example with 
reference to crop breeding, Zohrabian et al. (2003) estimate the marginal value of the   13
genetic material held in the U.S. National Plant Germplasm System. The genesis of 
their work is the common denominator in the contributions exploring search, namely 
the notion that search, which is costly generates potential benefits. Exploiting this 
notion, they employ maximum entropy methods to estimate research success 
probabilities of discovering the trait for resistance to soybean cyst nematode. Data on 
soybean prices and area planted are used in order to evaluate present value of the 
benefits deriving from search. The paper is highly appreciated reporting in details main 
average costs concerning the acquisition (340$ per accession), conservation (185$ per 
accession, per year) and evaluation (7$ per accession, per trait) of the genetic stocks. 
The authors lastly determine that even so the accessions marginal values are low, 
largely outweighs their costs of maintenance. 
Along similar lines, Simpson et al. (1999) assess the probability for a marginal 
species to be used in a commercial product for pharmaceutical purposes. They 
consider the search process as a sequence of Bernoulli trials in which the outcome is a 
discretized random variable assuming one of the two results, namely ‘success’ or 
‘failure’. The Bernoulli distributions well adapt to simulate the search for both 
qualitative (discrete) and quantitative genetic traits. Even if the characteristic of the 
quantitative traits is a continuous outcome, to impose a threshold value adapts them 
easily to a Bernoulli trials, ‘success’ if the value exceed the threshold, ‘failure’ 
otherwise. They use their model to assess the marginal economic value of a single 
‘species’ hold in-situ. The authors conclude that, in general, genetic resources stocks 
are characterized by low value and diminished attractiveness for pharmaceutical 
purposes. 
 
4.  SEARCHING FOR A DIRECT USE VALUE, THE MODEL 
The model here proposed (Gotor et al., 2007) aims to describe the principal 
characteristic of the search process: choosing the best outcome from a set of random 
trials. The model attempts to simulate the researcher action of locating the genetic 
material stored in a gene bank that offers the maximum return for the desired trait, 
such as disease resistance or yield productivity enhancement. Each trial is an 
agronomic test or a genetic screening of a single accession requested from a genebank. 
In other related search works, for example in Zohrabian et al. (2003), the most desired   14
return is associated with the minimum. Simpson et al. (1996) instead set the necessary 
condition that the desired value is simply over a prearranged threshold. Let x1, x2, x3, 
… xn denote the quantities obtained from N successive accessions or searches for the 
trait, and assuming that the quantities are random variables, distributed according to a 
given probability function with density f(x). Furthermore the trials are supposed to be 
independent of each other. If N denotes the number of the accessions, N
* is the optimal 
number of accessions that maximizes the research process’s objective function. The 
form of the objective function assumes so a primary interests, driving researcher 
behaviour, to imply subsequent empirical developments and theoretical considerations. 
For the above reasons, attempting to impose assumption less restrictive as possible, the 
objective function is arranged to be simply constituted by an expected benefit from the 
outcome of the search process, and by the costs occurred during the search process. 
Imposing yN ≡max{x1, x2, .., xN}, with yN  clearly function of N, the selection of the 
optimal level of N = N
* is determined by the solution to the following maximization 
problem: 
(4)   [ ] { }, ) ( ) ( ) ; ( max N N
N
y Costs y Benefits U E N − ≡ ⋅ Φ  
where U[·] denotes utility derived from search process, Benefits (yN) is the benefit 
function that describes completely the gains obtained from locating yN, the maximum 
among the N accessions, and Cost (yN) is the costs function that include the costs 
incurred in seeking the trait. For simplicity it is assumed that both benefits and costs 
are linear in yN. The benefits function can assume so the form Benefit (yN) ≡ α yN, 
with α > 0 and equal to the benefits that the researcher receives for each successful 
realization of the N trials. In the same way the costs function is supposed to have the 
form Cost (yN) ≡ k N with k > 0, and representing the unit constant cost to perform 
each search and screening exercise, with k N evidently equal to the total cost of 
screening of N trials. The utility derived from transacting N accessions is therefore:  
(5)   U[·]≡ α yN – k N. 
To investigate the actual form of the objective function and proceed to model 
the demand for accessions, namely the optimal value N
* chosen by the researcher, it is 
necessary to know the form of the distribution f(x) and so how the outcomes of the 
research x1, x2, .., xN are distributed. In this regard, Gollin et al. (2000) stated that the   15
traits are distributed in the set in several ways. Although normal distribution roughly 
fits quantitative genetic traits such as crop’s yield or height, generally traits for biotic 
resistance or abiotic tolerance follow uncertain patterns. This work follows the Stigler 
basic model, (1961). To simplify essentially the computations the unknown outcome 
of the trials is assumed to be a continuous random variable, on the standardized 
interval [0,1]: the function assumes 1 if X ∈[0,1] and assumes the value zero, 
otherwise.  
As explained before this assumption is not fully realistic, but considering the 
purpose of this work, it allows to make some further deductions facilitating the 
computation task. Maintaining the assumption, it is possible to derive from the 
probability distribution function f(x) the cumulative distribution F(h) =  ∫ ∞ −
h ƒ(x) dx ≡ 
℘(x≤h), that in the case of the unit uniform distribution become F(h) =  ∫
h
0 1dx = h.  
To locate the maximum among N possible trials is necessary to look up the 
problem of defining a distribution function for the maximum. This problem is highly 
simplified principally thanks to the assumption that the originating distribution f(x) is 
standard uniform. Following the order statistics theory, the first step to locate the 
maximum is to derive the cdf corresponding to the maximum within the sample: Fyn(y) 
= ℘[ yN≤y ] = ℘[ x1≤y; x2≤y;…;xN≤y ]. Considering the trials independent from each 
other, then Fyn(y) = Πi ℘[ xi≤y ] = ΠiFxi(y). If the draws are made from the same 
distribution, as it happens, Fyn(y) = Fx(y)
N. By differentiating is possible to obtain the 
pdf associated with yN, fyN ( y ) = N[ FX(y)]
N-1fx( y ). Lastly benefiting that the 
originating distribution fx(·) is standard uniform, fyN ( y ) = Ny
N-1, naturally function of 
N and y. At this point is possible to obtain an explicit solution to the optimization 
problem (4): 
(6)  





 α N y
N dy – k N, 
where ymin = 0 and ymax = 1, because they are respectively the minima and maxima 
available across the support of the standard uniform distribution. Resolving the 
integral, the first order condition necessary that is necessary and sufficient to find the 
maximum is therefore:   16
(7)   φ(N;α,κ)  ≡  
2 ) 1 N (
N ) 1 N (
+
α − + α
 - k  = 0. 
The above formula implies easily a realistic search situation: the solution of the 
equation, N
*, infact, increases with the increasing of α, (the benefit coefficient) and 
decreases with the increasing of the screening costs, k. Graphically, the first-order 
condition generates a solution of the form: 
 
These basic concepts lay the basis for the successive considerations on the 
changes of the demand for the genebanks’ accessions, that is equivalent in changes in 
the optimal value N*, because a variation of the perceived costs or benefits of 
accessions. For example, in the case of increased benefits, or reduction of screening 
costs, the demand should be boosted, and N* should perform a change of the possible 
pattern depicted by the following graphic: 
 
And instead, with the increase of the costs, or reduction of the outcome’s 
benefits, a change of the form below should be observed.  









In this way, it is possible to explain changes in the demand for germplasm, 
considering the fluctuating pattern of the counts data of germplasm’s accessions 
recorded in the CGIAR genebanks databases. Furthermore, because the CGIAR 
collections have a direct use value strictly related to the search process modelled here, 
a variation of the demand imply automatically a change in the whole resources’ stock 
economic value. The incremented value so is caused for example by a diminution of 
the transactions costs associated with the reduction in effort required to screen 
samples, or for an introduction of an international agreement that makes the resources 
freely accessible. In the framework presented here, this situation is modelled credibly 
as a reduction in the value of the parameter k that reflects, as said before, the per-unit 
cost of each single accession. Consequently, the relative contribution of establishment 
and the enforcement of the In-Trust Agreements, among the other factors’ demand, is 
expected be positive, reducing the k term, causing an increase in the search activity, 
implying so a higher number of accession or N* in the terminology adopted here. 
 
5.  ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE IN TRUST AGREEMENTS ON GERMPLASM DEMAND 
In this paragraph empirical applications will be provided, in order to give 
statistical evidence of the In-Trust influence on the genetic stocks’ demand. As 
described above, the favourable impact of the agreements on the availability and 
utilization of In-Trust material is the main hypothesis to prove statistically. The 
immediate impact of the In-Trust Agreements is on lowering transaction costs of 
germplasm’s accessions exchange, because the agreements assured a clear legal status 
(freely available) to the genetic resources, removing the uncertainty regarding property 
N
0 N  N’ 
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rights of the resources that characterized the period immediately after the Convention 
of Biological Diversity’s enactment (1993). Therefore thanks to the agreements, the 
demand for “In Trust” PGR should be relatively enhanced, increasing the genetic 
stocks direct-use value (search value), and consequently providing an economic 
improvement of the CGIAR collections’ value.  
Two are the empirical models selected to investigate the hypothesis. The 
Chib’s changepoints framework (1998) with latent state variable is chosen because it is 
explicitly formulated to assess count data changepoints, and so particularly qualified in 
estimation process without the inclusion of other covariates. Secondly, the Gaussian 
hierarchical count regression model, although its simplicity, is used to exploit the 
information provided by the hierarchical characteristics of the dataset. The estimations 
are conducted including data on genebanks utilizations and acquisitions provided by 
IRRI database. 
Data Description 
Prior to consider the empirical frameworks we present a broad overview of 
some of the data made available to us from IRRI genebank. The International Rice 
GenBank Collection (IRGC) at IRRI comprises the largest collection of rice 
germplasm held In-Trust for the world community. In fact, out of 111,631 accessions 
collected since 1961, 97,651 (87.5%) are In-Trust whereas 13,980 (12.5%) are not In-
Trust. More than 102,861 accessions belong to Asian cultivated rice (Oryza sativa), of 
which 92,040 (89%) are In-Trust and 2,809 accessions are from African cultivated rice 
(Oryza glaberrima), 1,201 (43%) of which are kept not In-Trust. IRRI maintains 
records of breeding pedigrees of all modern rice varieties derived from mating 
traditional varieties.  
Until the 2007 IRRI genebank distributed approximately 340,000 accessions. 
The overall distribution trend change significantly over time as shown in figure 5.1. 
The 1991 peak is followed by a constant diminishing of distribution numbers that ebbs 
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Dividing the overall flow, according to the different types of germplasm 
requests (within IRRI or outside IRRI), purposes (for research or other purposes as 
characterization and restoration), users’ organization (Universities, genebanks, privates 
or other CGIAR centres), and legal status of the requested germplasm (In Trust, or 
Not), (figure 5.2) it is possible to highlight a possible effect of the agreements 
adoption, providing a benchmark for further enhanced empirical enquiry.  
Fundamental in this regard is the movements around the time that the In-Trust 
Agreements were enacted. There are some indications of a “switch” around the time 
that the agreements were signed for the “In-Trust” accessions especially for “research” 
purposes. Of course, attributing such a switch to a single event – admittedly the focus 
of this review – would be nonsensical. However, the flow lines serve to motivate a 
juncture for considering additional detail, and accompanying them, the types of 
problems that one encounters in considering the possibilities of using accessions like 
those availed by the IRRI database to shed more light on the issue concerning trends 
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The broader empirical and methodological issues concerning formal statistical analysis 
of accessions counts are analysed in the next session.  
Multiple changepoints with latent state variable 
 
 The Chib’s approach (1998) to model multiple cases of change-points is 
proposed in this paragraph. The main innovation introduced in the framework, is the 
analysis of the change-point’s problem through the use of an unobserved discrete state 
variable that marks the possible phases into which the sample is split: furthermore this 
formulation makes the model not restricted to the existence of only one change-point. 
The counts data are modelled through a hierarchical Poisson relation: 
(8)    f
P(yt|ξt) ≡ ξt
yt exp{-ξt}/yt! 
wherein yt denotes the count in the year t; the density of yt is function of the parameter 
ξt. The value of ξt changes at unknown time points, Γm ={τ1, …, τm), (Chib, 1998). In a 
two times changepoints model, for example, Γm = {τ1,τ2), ξt is assumed to be subjected 
to two breaks, one at time τ1 and another at time τ2 such that ξt = λ1 for t ≤ τ1, ξt = λ2 for 
τ1 < t ≤ τ2 and ξt = λ3 for τ2 < t ≤ n, where τ1> 1 and τ2< n. The estimation effort is 
focused on the vector of the parameters λ, and on the unknown change points Γm. In 
order to reach the objective, Chib introduces in each period latent class data, st,   21
referred to as the ‘state’ of system at time t, corresponding to the m+1 phases in which 
the samples can be split. In details, st = k, means that the observation yt is drawn from 
the distributions f(yt|Yt-1, θk), where Yt-1 represents the observations up to time t-1, and 
θk the parameters marking the state k of the system. This latent state variable is 
formulated in the way to evolve according to a discrete-time, discrete-state Markov 
process with the transition probability matrix,℘, forced so that st either remains at the 
current value or jumps to the next highest value (Chib, 1998). Each elements of the 
jump probability matrix (℘) denote the probability of moving to regime j at time t, 
given that the state at time t-1 resides in regime i: pij = Prob(st = j|st-1 = i). The 
objective of the estimation is the posterior density p(SN, θ, ℘|YN) defined over the 
quantities θ ≡ { θ1, θ2, …, θm+1 }, the jump matrix ℘, and S, the unknown class of 
states, S ≡ (s1, s2, …,sN)΄. The derivation of the general forms of conditional 
distributions, the application of the Gibbs sampler algorithm with the right sequence of 
drawn are well explained in Chib, 1998 and Chib, 1996. Furthermore this model can 
be extended, to include additional data, replacing the determining parameters λ with 
sample information through the multiple xi΄β, attending carefully to the precise 
locations and scales of the elements of β. 
The above algorithm is used on the IRRI dataset previously described and used 
for the Gaussian count hierarchical model. The estimation is executed imposing only 
one change-point in the time-series of the IRRI distribution of samples, focusing on the 
samples demanded outside IRRI genebank, for research purpose, benefiting the In-
Trust status: we focus on this sub-category because according to the figure 5.2, it 
seems to be affected by the In Trust Agreements effects more than other categories. 
The MCMC algorithm is implemented with 10,000 iterations, (with commands 
executed in MATLAB 7). The posterior means for λ1 and λ2 as showed in figure 5.3, 
are respectively 3275 and 2828. The model performs efficiently, identifying as change-
point the period t = 13, occurring at the point of intersection of the two probabilities of 
st corresponding to the year 1995 (figure 5.4). The change-point marks the beginning 
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Figure 5.3:  Posterior marginal densities of λ1 and λ2 
 
 
Figure 5.4:  Pr(st = k | Yn), Germplasm demand dataset. 
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As said before it is not possible to attribute such changepoint to a single event, 
the In-Trust Agreements. This estimation outcome represents only the formal answer 
that is possible to give now with the current available data, without including in the 
model any possible covariates. But the model presented here can be extended to 
include further information. It is possible to account other factors affecting the 
germplasm demand, making the estimation effort more accurate. The following 
empirical framework will include other sources of information, attempting to highlight 
properly the “In-Trust” effect. 
 
A Gaussian Hierarchical Count Regression model 
The first empirical framework under investigation is simply an adaptation of 
the normal linear regression model, characterized by both a latent variable and 
hierarchical regression setup. Main reference’s source of this model’s structure is 
represented by Holloway, Barret and Ehui (2001) that applied it previously to model 
count data of stocks resources adoption among Ethiopian farmers. In detail, the model 
is described by the equation (9): 
(9)   zih = α +αhDhi
t + xih′β + uih,     i = 1, 2, .. N 
where xih ≡ (xih1, xih2, .., xihK)′ is the vector of covariates affecting zih, β ≡ (β1, β2, .., 
βK)′ is the relative coefficients’ vector of the covariates, and uih reflects the error term, 
generated from the distribution ƒ
N(ui|0,σ). To include count data characteristic of the 
dependent variable, zi is constrained to assumed values in the interval [j, j+1) if yi = j; 
αh represents the coefficient of the constant term, that for this work’s purpose is 
modelled hierarchically, corresponding to each sub-component of the data. It is also 
convenient to account through the hierarchical components the policy the supposed 
changepoint effect. A fixed effect dummy in fact is added splitting practically the time-
series sample in pre and after introduction of the agreements that coincides with the 
year 1994. Dhi
t = 1 for t > 1994; Dhi
t = 0 for t ≤ 1994, with t =1983, 1984, …,2006. 
 α ≡ (α1, α2, …, αH). h = 1,2, …,12, equals to the number of the sub-components of the 
IRRI germplasm demand included in the estimation. The only covariate used in the 
previously described hierarchical setup is a simple additive trend variable which 
parameter β accounts the effect. In the Gibbs sampler routine each αh is assumed to be 
drawn from a common distribution with mean μ and variance ω
2. For the complete   24
analytical discussion of the model, and for the succesfully Gibbs sampling algorithm 
application, see Holloway, Barret and Ehui (2001). 
 
6.  RESULTS DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Table 5.1 presents the results of the estimations; the numerical values in the 
central column are the means of the posterior densities. Ninety-five percent highest 
posterior density (hpd) intervals are also given. The estimates are obtained from a 
Gibbs sample running for 20,000 iterations (with commands executed in MATLAB 7, 
adapting a previous code elaborated by Holloway et al., 2001). 
 
Table 5.1:  Estimates of the hierarchical count model 
Coefficient  Means and 95% intervals 
α -60.9 12.6 192.6 
β (trend coefficient)  15.0 20.8 27.6 
μ (mean of αh) -387.1 -269.1 -197.2 
ω (st. dev. of αh)   0.5 36.1 153.3 
α1 (Not In-Trust) -513.1 -306.3 -227.7 
α2(to CGIAR centres/In-Trust)  -528.5 -306.9 -227.4 
α3(to Genebank/In-Trust)  -417.8 -276.3 -186.8 
α4(to National Program/In-Trust) -428.7 -279.3 -197.1 
α5 (to University/In-Trust) -297.8 -225.6 -34.1 
α6 (to Other Organization/In-Trust) -450.3 -284.7 -217.2 
α7 (to Private/In-Trust) -371.0 -257.4 -135.4 
α8(for Research/In-Trust) -296.1 -223.7 -31.85 
α9 (for Other purposes/In-Trust) -445.4 -286.2 -212.1 
α10 (In-Trust) -350.5 -249.5 -114.7 
α11 (Within IRRI/Not In-Trust) -386.2 -264.7 -160.6 
α12 (Within IRRI/In-Trust) 396.1 -266.0 -163.4 
σ  244.6 267.6 292.3 
R
2 0.55  
 
Overall the trend of germplasm demand is positive (β coefficient, table 5.1). 
The positive trend of germplasm is however affected by the constant term that is 
subdivided into different categories (α coefficients) relative to the utilization of 
germplasm in correspondence of the 1994 agreements’ enactment. The mean of the all 
α coefficients reported (μ) is negative, demonstrating that despite the positive trend of 
germplasm demand over the years, in correspondence of the 1994 agreements there is 
a minor level of germplasm utilization. In fact from table 5.1 we can observe how 
certain coefficients might be less affected compare to others. So material held not In-  25
Trust (α1) is reporting more negative results compared with those of the material held 
In Trust (α10). The reason of this might be manifold and cannot be empirically 
demonstrated. However this result is supporting the hypothesis, strengthened by 
interviews conducted with key informant, that the In-Trust Agreements actually 
maintained the germplasm flow that given the CBD threats, could have gone lost. 
Material In Trust requested for conducing research (α8) and the material requested by 
university (α5) are the one that reported a less negative decrease of utilization because 
of the agreements. This is an important results because it is the material utilized for 
research purposes that have a direct use economic value more important that the one 
that might occur because of other utilizations. Furthermore the efficacy of the model is 
also proved analyzing the parameters α11 and α12. We can not reject the null hypothesis 
H0: α11 = α12. In fact the In-Trust Agreements do not affect IRRI accession distributed 
within the research centre since scientists could freely use the material hosted by the 
centre even before the negotiations of the agreements. 
In conclusion, the In-Trust Agreements, signed in 1994 between FAO and 12 
CGIAR Centres, were the result of a lengthy process of protracted negotiations that 
had the single objective of regulating CGIAR germplasm, its acquisition and its 
distribution. A considerable challenge existed. This challenge was to find an 
agreement that could accommodate the needs of a heterogeneous set of key 
stakeholders. These stakeholders involved as many as twelve heterogeneous research 
centres, with distinct boards of trustees, distinct directorships and distinct internal 
infrastructures; and twelve distinct states, each with their own idiosyncratic regulations 
and legal infrastructures. The Agreements had also to meet the requirements of FAO 
Member States. The feasible solution that emerged was to apply to CGIAR collections 
the concept of ‘trusteeship.’ The key contribution of the In-Trust Agreements is that 
there is now an internationally recognized accord for the multilateral exchange of 
PGR, which in turn has prepared the ground for further multilateral agreements on 
PGR. 
Scope exists for nuanced empirical assessments of the fundamental values we 
should place on collections of genetic resources stocks, such as those ‘In-Trust’ in the 
CGIAR collections. We have proposed a link between a conceptual model of search 
and an empirical framework from which improved understanding of the fundamental   26
value of genetic resources may emerge and we have itemized an agenda of data needs 
for this purpose. 
 
REFERENCES  
Barnes, J. I., C. Schier, and G. Van Rooy, 1999. “Tourists' willingness to pay for 
wildlife viewing and wildlife conservation in Namibia.” South African Journal of 
Wildlife Research 29, no. 4(1999): 101-111. 
Chib, S., 1996. “Calculating Posterior Distributions and Modal Estimates in Markov 
Mixture Models.” Journal of Econometrics, 1996, 75(1), pp. 79-97. 
Chib, S., 1998. “Estimation and Comparison of Multiple Change-Point Models.” 
Journal of Econometrics, 1998, 86(2), pp. 221-41. 
Cicia, G., E. D'Ercole, and D. Marino, 2003. “Costs and benefits of preserving farm 
animal genetic resources from extinction: CVM and Bio-economic model for 
valuing a conservation program for the Italian Pentro horse.” Ecological Economics 
45, no. 3(2003): 445-459. 
Ehrlich, PR., EO. Wilson, 1991. “Biodiversity Studies – Science and Policy.” Science 
(Washington) 253(5021):758–762. 
Evenson, R., Y. Kislev, 1976. “A stochastic model of applied research.” Journal of 
Political Economy 84(2):265–282. 
Evenson, R., D. Gollin, 1997. “Genetic resources, international organizations, and 
improvement in rice varieties.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 
45(3):471–500. 
Evenson, R., D. Gollin, 1998 “An Application of Hedonic Pricing Methods to Value 
Rice Genetic Resources in India.” Agricultural Values of Plant Genetic Resources. 
CAB International, Wallingford, UK, 1998, pp. 139–50. 
Evenson, R., V. Santaniello, 1998. The economic value of plant genetic resources for 
agriculture. WCHR-World Conference on Horticultural Research 495:625–631. 
FAO., 1998. The State of the World's Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture. Rome. 
Fowler, C., M. Smale and S. Gaiji, 2000. “Germplasm Flows between Developing 
Countries and the Cgiar: An Initial Assessment.” Global Forum On Agricultural 
Research (GFAR). GFAR Secretariat/FAO in Rome, Italy, 2000. 
Fowler, C., 2000. “Establishing the Scope of a Multilateral System for Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture: Implications of Crop Exclusions.” Biopolicy 
Journal, 2000, 3, pp. 1. 
Gollin, D., M. Smale and B. Skovmand, 2000. “Searching an ex situ collection of 
wheat genetic resources.” American Journal of Agricultural Economic 82(4):812–
827. 
Gotor, E., F. Caracciolo, J. Watts, C. Srinivasan and G. Holloway, 2007. “The 
Multilateral Exchange of Germplasm: The Impact of In-Trust Agreements and the 
Role of Bioversity International.” Bioversity International, December 2007 report.   27
Holloway, G. J., C.B. Barrett and S. Ehui, 2001. “Cross-Bred Cow Adoption and Milk-
Market Participation in a Multivariate, Count-Data Framework.” Eurostat Special 
Issue: Bayesian Methods With Applications To Science, Policy and Official 
Statistics (2001):233-42. 
Jakobsson, K. M., and A. K. Dragun, 2001. “The Worth of a Possum: Valuing Species 
with the Contingent Valuation Method.” Environmental and Resource Economics 
19, no. 3(2001): 211-227. 
Johnson, N. L., D. Pachico and O. Voysest, 2003. “The Distribution of Benefits from 
Public International Germplasm Banks: The Case of Beans in Latin America.” 
Agricultural Economics, 2003, 29(3), pp. 277-86. 
Koo, B., PG. Pardey and BD. Wright, 2003. “The economic costs of conserving 
genetic resources at the CGIAR Centres.” Agricultural Economics 29(3):287–297. 
Kramer, R. A., and D. E. Mercer, 1997. “Valuing a Global Environmental Good: US 
Residents' Willingness to Pay to Protect Tropical Rain Forests.” Land Economics 
73, no. 2(1997): 196-210. 
Metrick, A. and M. L. Weitzman, 1998. “Conflicts and Choices in Biodiversity 
Preservation.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1998, 12(3), pp. 21-34. 
Milne, M., D. Godden, J. Kennedy, and R. Kambuou. 2002. “Evaluating the benefits 
of conserved crop germplasm in PNG managing plant genetic diversity”. In 
Managing plant genetic diversity, ed. J. M. M. Engels, V. Ramanatha Rao, A. H. D. 
Brown, and M. T. Jackson. Wallingford, U.K.: CABI Publishing. 
Pardey, PG., B. Koo, BD. Wright, ME. Eric Van Dusen, B. Skovmand and S. Taba, 
1999. “Costing the ex situ conservation of genetic resources: maize and wheat at 
CIMMYT”. EPTD Discussion Paper No. 52. IFPRI, Washington DC, 
USA/CIMMYT, Mexico. 
Pardey, PG., B. Koo, BD. Wright, ME. Van Dusen, B. Skovmand and S. Taba, 2001. 
“Costing the conservation of genetic resources: CIMMYT's ex situ maize and wheat 
collection.” Crop Science 41(4):1286–1299. 
Pearce, D. and D. Moran, 1994. The Economic Value of Biodiversity. IUCN, London 
(1994). 
Polasky, S., A. R. Solow and J. Broadus, 1993. “Searching for Uncertain Benefits and 
the Conservation of Biological Diversity.” Environmental and Resource Economics, 
1993, 3(2), pp. 171-81. 
Polasky, S. and A. R. Solow, 1995. “On the Value of a Collection of Species.” Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management, 1995, 29(3), pp. 298-303. 
Reist-Marti, S. B., H. Simianer, J. Gibson, O. Hanotte and J. E. O. Rege, “Weitzman's 
Approach and Conservation of Breed Diversity: An Application to African Cattle 
Breeds.” Conservation Biology, 2003, 17(5), pp. 1299-311. 
Rogerson, R., R. Shimer and R. Wright, 2005. “Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor 
Market: A Survey.” Journal of economic literature, 2005, 43(4), pp. 959-88. 
Rubenstein, K. D., P. Heisey, R. Shoemaker, J.Sullivan and G.Frisvold, 2005. “Crop 
Genetic Resources: An Economic Appraisal.” USDA Economic Information 
Bulletin No. 2(2005): 41 pp. 
   28
Sargent, T., 1987. Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press. 
Simianer, H., S. B. Marti, J. Gibson, O. Hanotte and J. E. O. Rege, 2003. “An 
Approach to the Optimal Allocation of Conservation Funds to Minimize Loss of 
Genetic Diversity between Livestock Breeds.” Ecological Economics, 2003, 45(3), 
pp. 377-92. 
Simpson, RD., RA. Sedjo and JW. Reid, 1996. “Valuing biodiversity for use in 
pharmaceutical research.” Journal of Political Economy 104(1):163–185. 
Smale, M., J. Hartell, PW. Heisey and B. Senauer, 1998. “The contribution of genetic 
resources and diversity to wheat production in the Punjab of Pakistan.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 80(3):482–493. 
Smale, M., B. Koo, 2003. “Introduction: A taxonomy of genebank value”. In: M Smale 
and B Koo (editors). Biotechnology and Genetic Resource Policies. What is a 
genebank worth? [IFPRI] Research at a Glance Briefs 7-12. Brief 7:1–5. 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC, USA. 
Stigler, GJ., 1961. “The economics of information”. Journal of Political Economy 
69(3):213–225. 
Swanson, T., 1998. “The Source of Genetic Resource Values and the Reasons for 
Their Management.” Agricultural Values of Plant Genetic Resources. CAB 
International, Wallingford, UK (1998): 67–81. 
Thirtle, C. G., 1985. “Technological Change and the Productivity Slowdown in Field 
Crops: United States, 1939-78.” Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
Weitzman, M. L., 1993. “What to Preserve? An Application of Diversity Theory to 
Crane Conservation.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993, 108(1), pp. 157-
83. 
Weitzman, M. L., 1998. “The Noah's Ark Problem.” Econometrica, 1998, 66(6), pp. 
1279-98. 
Zohrabian, A., G. Traxler, S. Caudill and M. Smale, 2003. “Valuing pre-commercial 
genetic resources: a maximum entropy approach.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 85(2):429–436. 